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Weisz: Administrative Law - An Uncommonly Rare Decision - The Wyoming Su

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - An Uncommonly Rare Decision-The
Wyoming Supreme Court Orders Agency Rulemaking. In the
Matter of Bessemer Mountain, Rissler & McMurry Co. v.
Environmental Quality Council, 856 P.2d 450 (Wyo. 1993).

Nothosaur. Hardly a name that stirs emotion. Yet fossils of this
prehistoric marine reptile from the Early Triassic Period played a role in
a present-day controversy. All of the known North American specimens
of the Nothosaur come from an area in central Wyoming known as Bessemer Mountain.' Rissler and McMurry Company (Rissler) operates a small
limestone mine on Bessemer Mountain on a state school land lease. 2
Rissler wanted to expand the mine and sought a permit from the Wyo-

ming Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ). 3
In response to Rissler's plans, a group known as the "Friends of
Bessemer Mountain" filed a petition with the Wyoming Environmental
Quality Council (EQC). 4 The petition requested that the EQC designate
Bessemer Mountain as "very rare or uncommon" pursuant to Wyoming
Statute § 35-11-112(a)(v). 5 This designation would allow the DEQ to deny
Rissler's mining plans if mining would irreparably damage the area.
The EQC scheduled and published notice of a hearing on the matter. 7 Concerned that the DEQ might deny its mining permit application,

Rissler objected to the hearing. Rissler argued that the EQC should make
1. Principal Statement of Reasons, In the Matter of a Petition to Designate Bessemer as Rare
and Uncommon (filed with Wyo. Secretary of State, Aug. 4, 1992) appended to Brief of Petitioner, In
the Matter of Bessemer Mtn., Rissler & McMurry Co. v. Environmental Quality Council, 856 P.2d
450 (Wyo. 1993) (No. 92-226) 1hereinafter Brief of Petitioner]. Rissler is the Petitioner, the Environmental Quality Council (EQC) is the Respondent.
2. In the Matter of Bessemer Mtn., Rissler & McMurry Co. v. Environmental Quality Council, 856 P.2d 450, 451 (Wyo. 1993) [hereinafter Bessemer]. Although WYO. STAT. § 35-11-406
(1988 & Supp. 1993) requires mines to have a DEQ permit, Wyo. STAT. § 35-11-401(e)(vi) (1988)
exempts mines smaller than ten acres from permit requirements. Rissler's existing mine was smaller
than ten acres. Brief of Petitioner, supra note I at 5.
3. Brief of Petitioner, supra note I at 5. Rissler sought a permit pursuant to WYO. STAT. §
35-11-406.
4. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 1 at 2.
of Petitioner, supra note 1 at 2-3. WYO. STAT. § 35-11-112(a)(v) (1988 & Supp. 1993)
5. Brief
provides that the EQC shall designate "those areas of the state which are very rare or uncommon and have
particular historical, archaeological, wildlife, surface geological, botanical or scenic value."
6. WYo. STAT. § 35-11-406(m)(iv) provides that the DEQ may deny a permit [i]f: "the proposed mining operation would irreparably harm, destroy, or materially impair any area that has been
designated by the council a rare or uncommon area
7. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 1 at 5.
8. Brief of Petitioner, supra note I at 5. Rissler objected in a letter to the EQC on April 9, 1992.
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rules for the rare or uncommon statute, because it was too ambiguous
standing alone. 9
On April 23 and 24, 1992, the EQC held a hearing on the petition
requesting the rare or uncommon designation." Many people spoke in
favor of the designation. Rissler's counsel was the only person who spoke
against the designation." Immediately after the hearing the EQC designated Bessemer Mountain as "very rare and uncommon." 2
On September 2, 1992, Rissler filed a petition in Wyoming state
district court for review of the designation. 3 Rissler and the EQC agreed
that in the interest of efficiency, the matter should be certified to the
Wyoming Supreme Court.' The supreme court directly addressed only
one issue-whether the rare or uncommon designation was arbitrary or
capricious. "

In a 5-0 decision, the court ruled that the Bessemer Mountain designation was arbitrary and capricious because the rare or uncommon statute
was "amorphous." 6 The court reversed the EQC designation, remanded
the matter, and ordered the EQC to make rules clarifying the rare or
uncommon statute.17

9. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 1 at 5. Rissler filed a formal written comment to the petition
on April 13, 1992, which addressed the criteria listed in the rare or uncommon statute. Rissler also
objected because: (1) the EQC had not scheduled a contested case hearing allegedly required by Wyo.
STAT. §§ 16-3-101 to -112 (1990 & Supp. 1993); (2) it did not have a copy of the citizen petition;
and (3) the EQC listed paleontology-the Nothosaur fossils-as a unique feature of Bessemer Mountain, a subject not listed in the rare or uncommon statute. Id.
10. Bessemer, 856 P.2d at 451.
11. Brief of Respondent at 3, In the Matter of Bessemer Mm., Rissler & McMurry Co. v.
Environmental Quality Council, 856 P.2d 450 (Wyo. 1993) (No. 92-226) [hereinafter Brief of Respondent].
12. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 1 at 4. The EQC designated nine sections of land encompassing the mountain, including the section containing Rissler's mine. On August 7, 1992, the EQC
filed a "Principal Statement' of Reasons" for the designation with the Secretary of State. Id. at 7.
NOTE: The EQC designated the lands as "very rare and uncommon." This note uses "rare or uncommon," as listed in the statute, and drops "very."
13. Brief of Respondent, supra note 11 at 2. Rissler filed the petition with Judge Spangler in
the Second Judicial Court. Id. at 4.
14. Brief of Respondent, supra note 11 at 2. The district court judge granted a joint motion to
certify on September 28, 1992. Wyoming Rule of Appellate Procedure 12.09 provides for interlocutory appeal to the supreme court if constitutional, novel, or important local/state-wide questions are
raised.
15. Bessemer, 856 P.2d at 451. The issues certified were whether the EQC's actions: (1) were
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion; (2) violated Rissler's due process and equal protection
rights; (3) were in excess of its statutory jurisdiction; (4) violated state law and administrative procedure; and (5) were supported by substantial evidence. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 455.
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The primary issue discussed in this casenote is whether the Bessemer
court properly ordered the EQC to make rules to augment the rare or
uncommon statute. The casenote discusses required rulemaking jurisprudence from Wyoming, federal, and other state courts. It illustrates how
the Bessemer court departed from Wyoming precedent, as well as law
from other jurisdictions. The casenote also criticizes the court for inexplicably changing the method of review of administrative agency action.
Additionally, the casenote is critical of the court's policy rationale, and
discusses how the court unnecessarily intruded on EQC discretion. The
casenote concludes that court-ordered rulemaking is appropriate in certain
circumstances, but that the Bessemer case did not present any such circumstances. Nonetheless, the casenote acknowledges that Bessemer might
serve as an important precedent in Wyoming administrative law.
BACKGROUND

The Wyoming Environmental Quality Act
The rare or uncommon statute is part of the Wyoming Environmental Quality Act"8 (EQA) enacted in 1973 to preserve and enhance the air,
land, and water resources of the state.1 9 Because the EQA is an environmental protection statute, the Wyoming Supreme Court usually construes
it liberally. 2'
The Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) administers the EQA. 2" The Wyoming Environmental Quality Council (EQC) is
the hearing examiner for the DEQ. Thus, the EQC hears all cases arising
under the EQA and DEQ regulations.' The EQC has broad discretion.
For instance, the EQC has the power to grant variances to EQA requirements,' and has ultimate control over DEQ rules, permits, and orders.2'
Additionally, the EQC has rulemaking authority.2 Generally, the EQC

18. WYO. STAT. §§ 35-11-101 to -1428 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
19. WYO. STAT. § 35-11-102.
20. See People v. Platte Pipe Line Co., 649 P.2d 208, 212 (Wyo. 1982); Universal Equip. Co.

v. State, 839 P.2d 967, 970 (Wyo. 1992).
21. WYO. STAT. § 35-11-104 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
22. WYO. STAT. § 35-11-112.
23. See WYo. STAT. § 35-11-601(a) (1988 & Supp. 1993), which gives the EQC power to grant

variances because of (b) impracticality; (c) excess cost; (d) non-existent technology; or (e) hardship.
24. See WYO. STAT. § 35-11-112(c), which provides that the EQC may: "fa]pprove, disap-

prove, repeal, modify or suspend any rule, regulation, standard or order of the director or any division administrator; ...

[o]rder that any permit, license ....

or variance be granted, denied, suspend-

ed, revoked or modified."
25.

WYO. STAT. § 35-11-112(a)(i). The EQC must consult with the DEQ director and admin-

istrators when promulgating rules. Id.
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has discretion to decide whether rules are necessary, but several EQA
statutes specifically require the EQC to make rules.26
Under the EQA rare or uncommon statute, the EQC may designate
areas of Wyoming which are "very rare or uncommon and have particular
historical, archaeological, wildlife, surface geological, botanical or scenic
value." '27 The EQC uses the designation sparingly.' Bessemer was the
first challenge to a designation to come before the Wyoming Supreme Court.29

26. See, e.g., WYO. STAT. § 35-11-503(a)(iii) (1988 & Supp. 1993) (EQC must make rules to
guide the solid waste disposal site selection process); WYO. STAT. § 35-11-202 (1988 & Supp. 1993)
(rules required to define ambient air and emission control standards); WYO. STAT. § 35-11-402 (1988
& Supp. 1993) (rules required for land quality reclamation standards).
27. WyO. STAT. § 35-11-112(a)(v).
28. [NOTE: The "unique and irreplaceable" statute preceded the rare or uncommon statute, and
provided that the EQC shall "designate... those areas of the state which areof a unique and irreplaceable,
historical, archaeological, scenic, or natural value."] Areas of Wyoming so designated include:
(1)January 25, 1974. An EQC Resolution designating as unique and irreplaceable those areas of
Wyoming including Wyoming Recreation Commission Inventory of Historical Places, U.S. Department of
Interior National Register of Historical Places, National and State parks, National and State wildlife refuges,
National Trails, National Wilderness Areas, Wild & Scenic Rivers, National and State Recreation Areas,
monuments, forts, museums, ranger stations, petroglyph sites, dams, depots, and sites listed by the University of Wyoming Department of Archaeology, the Wyoming Recreation Commission, and the Wyoming Archives and Historical Department.
(2) October 25, 1974. An EQC Resolution designating as unique and irreplaceable approximately
19,000 acres in Sheridan and Johnson Counties near Storey.
(3) October 25, 1974. An EQC Resolution designating as unique and irreplaceable 920 acres in
Johnson County.
(4) December 9, 1977. An EQC resolution designating as unique and irreplaceable an area in
Natrona County known as Jackson Canyon.
Memorandum from Terri A. Lorenzon, EQC Attorney and Administrator, to EQC Members, Review of Designations Under the Environmental Quality Act (April 23, 1991) (on file with the
EQC in Cheyenne, WY).
29. In the Meeteetse Preservation Organization case (MPO), the MPO petitioned the EQC to
designate an area of the Upper Wood River drainage near the old mining town of Kirwin as unique
and irreplaceable. AMAX, Inc. was considering opening a copper mine in the Kirwin area. During
the case, the Legislature amended the statute to the "rare or uncommon" form. The EQC designated
the area as rare or uncommon. AMAX filed suit. Judge Joseph Maier of the Fifth Judicial District
Court remanded the case to the EQC for determination under the language of the new rare or uncommon statute. Before the EQC acted again, the parties (including the MPO, EQC, and AMAX) stipulated to a dismissal. Thereafter, the copper market fell, AMAX gave up its mining plans, and the
MPO never re-petitioned for a new designation. Memorandum from T. Lorenzon, supra note 28.
Importantly, however, the dismissal stipulation required the EQC to "attempt to" make rules defining the rare or uncommon statute. AMAX, Inc., v. Environmental Quality Council, Civ. Action No. 10751
(5th Jud. Dist. Ct., Park County, filed in the EQC office in Cheyenne, WY, on Feb. 23, 1982).
R.E. Sundin, a past DEQ director, investigated the possibility of rules, and decided that rules
would be "glib assertions." He recommended that the EQC conclude that rules could not be promulgated.
Memorandum from R.E. Sundin, DEQ Director, to the EQC, Promulgation of Statewide Standards for
W.S. 35-11-112(a)(v) (January 28, 1981) (on file with the EQC in Cheyenne, WY).
The EQC agreed with Sundin, and decided to substitute detailed fact findings for rules when designating lands in the future. Bessemer is the first case since MPO where the EQC used the designation. Interview with Tern Lorenzon, EQC Attorney and Administrator, in Cheyenne, WY (Oct. 18, 1993).
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Required Rules & Adjudication Versus Rulemaking
Administrative agencies use two types of proceedings to administer
statutes: rulemaking and adjudication. Rulemaking is an agency action that
creates a regulation designed to implement, interpret, and prescribe a statute
or policy.3" Thus, rulemaking is the process of making rules that apply prospectively to all concerned persons. Adjudication is the process of resolving
disputes between an agency and a particular party.31 Orders resolving the
matter ensue from adjudications. 2
Under the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act3 (WAPA) the EQC
treats citizen petitions for designation of lands as rare or uncommon as petitions for rulemaking.34 Thus, the Bessemer designation hearing was a
rulemaking proceeding.35 The Wyoming Supreme Court reviews EQC actions
under authority from WAPA and can set aside agency action which is arbitrary or capricious.36

Wyoming Precedent
Judicial review of administrative agency action by the Wyoming Supreme Court is commonplace, but the Wyoming Supreme Court has dealt
with the issue of required rulemaking on few occasions. Typically, the court
defers to agency discretion on whether rules are needed for an agency to
administer a statute, or whether the agency can employ case-by-case adjudication.37 The court has explained its deference as an unwillingness to remove
agency flexibility to deal with special problems.3"
For example, in Town of Torrington v. Environmental Quality Council, 39 the Wyoming Supreme Court held that the EQC need not create rules

30. WYo. STAT. § 16-3-101.
31. In Wyoming an adjudication is called a contested case. See WYO. STAT. § 16-3-101(b)(ii),
which defines a contested case as "a proceeding including but not restricted to rate making, price
fixing and licensing, in which legal rights, duties or privileges of a party are required by law to be
determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing."
32.

See Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(6)-(7) (1988) [hereinafter APA].

33. WYo. STAT. §§ 16-3-101 to -115 (1990).
34. See Brief of Petitioner, supra note I at 2-3, referring to Wyo. STAT. § 16-3-106.

35. Brief of Petitioner. supra note 1 at 2-3. Thus, the issue in Bessemer was whether the EQC
needed rules to validate its action pursuant to the rare or uncommon statute.
36. WYo. STAT. § 16-3-114(c)(iiXA). This statute also authorizes courts to set aside action which is:
"(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction.
authority or limitations or lacking statutory right; (D) without observance of procedure required by law; or
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing...
37. See infra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
38. Town of Torrington v. Environmental Quality Council, 557 P.2d 1143. 1146 (Wyo. 1976).
39. 557 P.2d 1143 (Wyo. 1976).
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to guide the selection of solid waste disposal sites. Although the town cited a
statute requiring the EQC to promulgate rules,'o the court ruled that disposal
sites must be selected on a case-by-case basis. Therefore, rules were not
necessary. 4 ' The court ruled that the EQC had the expertise and discretion to
decide whether rules were necessary. 4'
In Thomson v. Wyoming In-Stream Flow Committee43 the court ruled
that the Wyoming Secretary of State need not promulgate rules to guide the
signature verification process in petitions for statewide ballot initiatives." The
court held that a clear statutory directive is enforceable-without rules-by an
agency in accordance with its plain meaning. 5
Federal Precedent
Federal courts usually defer to agency discretion on whether rules are
necessary. While federal administrative law and the federal Administrative
Procedure Act" (APA) differ from state administrative law, there are some
analogies .'7

Undoubtedly the most important federal case addressing the required
rulemaking issue is Securities & Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp.4" In
Chenery, the United States Supreme Court held that the choice to proceed by
general rule or by individual ad hoc adjudication should be left to agency
discretion. 49 Justice Murphy explained that to insist upon one form of action
over the other is "to exalt form over necessity."5' Although almost fifty years
old, Chenery is still cited by courts deferring to agency discretion on the
rulemaking issue. 5
40. WYO. STAT. § 35-502.12(a) (1957) provided: "The council shall: . . . (i) [p]romulgate

rules and regulations necessary for the administration of this act.
41. 557 P.2d at 1146.
42. Id.

43. 651 P.2d 778 (Wyo. 1982).
44. The Wyoming Constitution established the initiative and referendum process. It states that
"additional procedures may be prescribed by law." WYo. CONST. art. III § 52 (f). WYO. STAT. § 2224-101(a)(iii) (1977) required initiative petitions to contain signatures equaling at least fifteen percent
of the number of voters in the last general election and resident in at least two-thirds of the counties
of the State.
45. 651 P.2d at 791. Contra, Jergeson v. Bd. of Trustees of Sch. Dist. No. 7, 476 P.2d 481,
483-84 (Wyo. 1970) (where the court noted that some statutes require rulemaking, and suggested that
it would direct an agency to comply upon request by an interested party). See infra note 107.
46. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scat-

tered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
47. Arthur E. Bonfield, Chairman'sMessage, 40 ADMIN. L. REV. III at iv-v (1988).
48. 332 U.S. 194 (1947).

49. Id. at 203.
50. Id. at 202.
51.

See, e.g., Nunez-Pena v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 956 F.2d 223, 225 (10th

Cir. 1992) (where the court upheld the I.N.S.'s choice to create a policy through adjudication-rather
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The Supreme Court substantiated Chenery in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace
Co. 2 In Bell, the Court explained that a problem facing an agency "may be
so specialized and varying in nature as to be impossible of capture within the
boundaries of a general rule." 53 The Court noted, however, that there may be
situations where adjudication without rules would be an abuse of discretion or
a violation of the APA.54 Unfortunately, the Court has not crafted a definitive
test delineating when rules are required."
Accordingly, without any standard test, the federal courts have struggled with the issue. Nonetheless, three general situations emerge in which
courts have required agencies to make rules. The first situation occurs when
an agency charged with dispensing tangible economic benefits uses ad hoc
adjudication to determine eligibility for those benefits. In Morton v. Ruiz,56
the United States Supreme Court, on due process grounds, ordered the
Bureau of Indian Affairs to promulgate rules describing eligibility requirements for general assistance benefits.57
Significantly, a prominent commentator noted that the fundamentals and
details of the Ruiz opinion are not in accord with traditional understanding of
administrative law.5 Furthermore, courts that follow Ruiz normally apply it
only in cases involving distribution of economic benefits.5 9

than rulemaking-that forced potential deportees to show "unusual or outstanding equities" to avoid
deportation); Nevada Power Co. v. Watt, 711 F.2d 913, 927 (10th Cir. 1983) (where the Dept. of
Interior was free to choose between rulemaking and adjudication when setting application costs for
utility rights-of-way).
52. 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
53. Id. at 293 (quoting Chenery, 332 U.S. at 203).
54. 416 U.S. at 294.
55. Richard K. Berg, Re-examining Policy Procedures: The Choice Between Rulemaking and
Adjudication. 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 11 149, 155 (1986).
56. 415 U.S. 199 (1974).
57. Id. at 231.
58. KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.27, at 140 (2d. ed. 1979).
Davis found three basic problems with Ruiz: First, the Court stated that "Ithe power of an administrative agency to administer a ... program necessarily requires the ...making of rules to fill any
gap left ... by Congress." 415 U.S. at 231. Davis called this overbroad, against congressional intent, and an abrupt change from past understanding. Davis noted that the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) issued only three substantive rules in four decades. Id. § 7.27 at 143.
Second, Davis criticized the Court's suggestion that agency policy is ineffective unless embodied as a legislative-type rule. See 415 U.S. at 231-36. Davis said this comment "pulls one way
and common sense pulls the other way." Id. §7.27 at 145.
Third, Davis criticized the Court's comment that the federal APA forbids "unpublished ad
hoc determinations." 415 U.S. at 232. Davis noted that the APA does not forbid unpublished ad hoc
determinations. Id. §7.27 at 153.
59.

ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 3.2, at 74.

(1993). See also Holmes v. New York City Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d 262 (2d. Cir. 1968) (agency
violated an applicant's due process rights without rules to guide allocation of public housing); White
v. Roughton, 530 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1976) (the court suggested that the agency develop written
eligibility standards for a township assistance program; the lack of rules violated the applicant's due
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The second situation in which federal courts occasionally require
rulemaking occurs when an agency uses an adjudication to fashion a new
policy or law of potential general applicability. For instance, in Ford Motor
Co. v. Federal Trade Commission6° the agency used an adjudicatory proceeding to announce a new policy regarding the repossession and resale of autos.61 In Ford Motor, the Ninth Circuit Court ruled that if an agency changes
past policies and establishes a rule of widespread application, it must do so
through formal rulemaking.62
Significantly, other federal courts and some commentators criticize Ford
Motor's proposition that an agency cannot change existing law through adjudication. 3 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit retreated from Ford Motor when it held
that an agency can announce new policies and clarify uncertain areas of the
law by adjudication.'
The third situation where courts order rulemaking is when an agency
fails to make rules as required by statute. In EnvironmentalDefense Fund v.
Ruckelshaus6' the court ordered the Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate
rules regarding agency treatment of citizen petitions requesting suspension of
pesticide registrations. A federal statute required agency rules regarding
pesticide registration and public input.'

process rights); Baker-Chaput v. Cammett, 406 F. Supp. 1134 (D.N.H. 1976) (where the court ordered the state welfare administrator to make rules to guide dispersal of benefits).
60. 673 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 999 (1982).
61. Id. at 1008-09. After selling repossessed autos, the dealer credited the defaulting debtor
only the wholesale value of the vehicle, keeping any surplus. The dealer also charged the debtor for
overhead and refurbishing costs. These practices were common throughout the auto industry and the
FTC had not previously proscribed them. In the Ford Motor adjudication, the FTC ruled that the
practices violated a section of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1988) (unfair
methods of competition).
62. Id. at 1009. See also Patel v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 638 F.2d 1199 (9th
Cir. 1980) (I.N.S. ruling reversed because I.N.S. used adjudication to announce a new requirement
for permanent immigration); First Bancorporation v. Bd. of Governors, 728 F.2d 434 (10th Cir.
1984) (where the Federal Reserve Board improperly used adjudication to announce a broad policy
regarding the interest rate treatment of NOW accounts).
63. Nevada Power Co. v. Watt, 711 F.2d 913, 927 (10th Cir. 1983); Colo. Dep't of Social
Serv. v. Dep't of Health & Human Serv., 585 F. Supp. 522, 525 (D. Colo. 1984). See also Berg
supra note 55 at 155 (the Ford Motor proposition is "so broad as to be demonstrably untenable under
established case law.")
64. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 691 F.2d 1322, 1328 (9th Cir. 1982).
See also Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. NLRB, 716 F.2d 1249 (9th Cir. 1983) (agency can
announce new remedy for previously proscribed conduct through adjudication); City of Anaheim v.
FERC, 723 F.2d 656, 659 (9th Cir. 1984) (adjudication proper to fine-tune an existing rule).
65. 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971) [hereinafter Ruckelshaus].
66. The court cited sections of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act which
are now superseded. 7 U.S.C. § 135(b) (1964) superseded by Act of Oct. 21, 1972, P.L. 92-516, 86
Stat. 975 (current version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988)). Additionally, the Secretary failed to
provide any reason for denying the citizen petition; this probably was as important to the holding as
the lack of rules. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d at 596.
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In conclusion, federal courts generally defer to agency discretion on
whether to proceed by rulemaking or adjudication. While there are three
general situations in which federal courts have ordered rulemaking, courtordered rulemaking is often criticized by other courts and commentators.
Precedent from Other States
State administrative law addressing the required rulemaking issue varies
by jurisdiction. For example, the Florida Legislature recently enacted a statute announcing "rulemaking is not a matter of agency discretion." 67 Conversely, some state courts defer almost entirely to agency discretion between
rulemaking and adjudication. These courts allow agencies to announce new
policy or law through adjudication.68 Thus, few generalizations are possible.
Nonetheless, discussion of authority from other states sheds light on the
Bessemer decision.
Some courts have crafted explicit, detailed tests for determining whether
court-ordered rulemaking is appropriate. For example, in Metromedia, Inc. v.
Director, Division of Taxation,69 the New Jersey Supreme Court held that an
agency should proceed through rulemaking instead of adjudication if most of
the following characteristics are present:
It [agency action] . . . (1) is intended to have wide coverage encom-

passing a large segment of the regulated or general public, rather
than an individual or a narrow select group; (2) is intended to be

See also Mtn. States Legal Found. v. Andrus, 499 F. Supp. 383 (D. Wyo. 1980). In Andrus
the court ordered the Secretaries of Agriculture and Interior to make rules for withdrawal of public
lands from consideration for oil and gas leasing. The United States Forest Service (USFS) was considering the lands in question for inclusion in the National Wilderness system. The USFS delayed action on the lease applications until the Wilderness status was clear. The court deemed the inaction a
"withdrawal" under §1702(j) of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. §§1701-64
(FLPMA). FLPMA § 1740 required the agencies to promulgate rules guiding the withdrawal of
lands. 499 F. Supp. at 395-97.
The Bessemer court cited Mtn. States Legal Found. v. Hodel, 668 F.Supp. 1466 (D. Wyo.
1987) for the proposition that an agency must promulgate rules when agency action is legislative or
substantive. Bessemer, 856 P.2d at 453. Hodel was similar toAndrus, where the USFS again delayed
action on oil and gas lease applications. During the pendency of Hodel, the USFS agreed to promulgate rules, so the court did not have to order rulemaking.
In Bob Marshall Alliance v. Hodel, 852 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1988), the court criticized
Andrus and Hodel for reasoning that inaction on lease applications amounted to a FLPMA
withdrawal.
67. See Eric T. Olsen, Required Rulemaking Under Florida'sAPA: An Analysis of "Feasible"
and "Practicable," 67 FLA. B.J. VII 62 (July/Aug. 1993) (citing § 120.535 of theFlorida Administrative Procedure Act, 1991 Fla. Laws ch. 191).
68. See Am. Fed'n State, County, & Mun. Employees Council 25 v. Wayne County, 393
N.W.2d 889, 894 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986).
69. 478 A.2d 742 (N.J. 1984).
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applied generally and uniformly to all similarly situated persons; (3)
is designed to operate only in future cases

. .

. ; (4) prescribes a

legal standard or directive that is not otherwise expressly provided by
or clearly and obviously inferable from the enabling statutory authorization; (5) reflects an administrative policy that (i) was not previously expressed in any official and explicit agency determination,
adjudication or rule, or (ii) constitutes a material and significant
change from a clear, past agency position on the identical subject
matter; and (6) reflects a decision on administrative regulatory policy
in the nature of the interpretation of law or general policy.7"
New Jersey courts also use the test to describe the circumstances where rules
are needed to validate agency actions that cannot be properly characterized as
rulemaking or adjudication (such as the Bessemer case).7 The Metromedia
test typifies treatment of the required rulemaking issue in state courts which
occasionally require agency rulemaking.72
Besides the factors listed above, legislative intent is important in
determining whether an agency must make rules to administer a statute.
For instance, in Trebesch v. Employment Division,73 an Oregon court

listed the factors it examined when determining whether the legislature
implicitly intended for an agency to make rules defining a vague statutory
phrase. The court examined the: (1) character of the statutory term, (2)
breadth of agency tasks, (3) agency organizational structure, and (4)
scope of agency responsibility such as fact finding, interpretation, application of law, and policy development. 74
In conclusion, most state courts are in accord with federal treatment
of the required rulemaking issue. Agencies normally are free to choose
between rulemaking and adjudication. Thus, case-by-case adjudication of
a statutory scheme without rules is proper as long as due process is maintained, no new broad policies or laws are announced, and statutory
rulemaking requirements are met.

70. Id. at 751.
71. In re Paterson Counseling Ctr., 567 A.2d 282. 285 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989). See
supra note 35.
72. See generallyIn re Hibbing Taconite Co., 431 N.W.2d 885 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (agency has discretion to choose between rulemaking and adjudication, but rules are required when specific
facts are not being applied to specific parties); Forelaws on Bd. v. Energy Facility Siting Council,
760 P.2d 212 (Or. 1988) (rulemaking is required if the agency sets policy and the statute at issue is
broad); Sears, Roebuck, & Co. v. Baca, 682 P.2d 11 (Colo. 1984) (agency must use rules to guide
disbursements from worker's compensation fund to employers).
73. 710 P.2d 136 (Or. 1985).
74. Id. at 139-40. See infra note 133 and accompanying text for application of the Trebesch
test to Bessemer.
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Policy Considerations
Finally, policy considerations factor into the required rulemaking
issue. Generally, rulemaking is not inherently superior to adjudication
as an agency decision-making tool.' Each method has advantages and
limitations. The circumstances of each situation dictate which method
is preferable.76
Case-by-case adjudication allows for in-depth exploration of fact
issues. It also helps resolve narrow policy issues concerning a limited
number of parties.' Further, adjudication generally provides more
procedural protection than rulemaking to the party most immediately
affected by an agency action. 7"
Although rulemaking is time-consuming, agencies prefer it over
adjudication when facing an issue with potentially broad impact and
application. First, the formal notice and comment requirements of
rulemaking allow for input from non-parties, who would have no
opportunity to comment during an adjudication.79 Second, this input
comes without the argument and trial-like atmosphere of an adjudication." Finally, once a rule is established and published, the need for
case-by-case adjudication is eliminated. Issues often can be resolved in
a near-summary manner, increasing the efficiency of agency action. 8,
In conclusion, both rulemaking and adjudication have a place in
administrative law. The argument that the agency is best-equipped to2
decide whether rules are necessary carries the day in most courts.
Furthermore, while some people express concern about agencies acting
without rules, judicial review protects interested parties. Courts can
restrain agencies that act unlawfully or unreasonably, without intruding on overall agency power.83 Rulemaking might be preferable in
many situations, but adjudication is necessary when a problem cannot
be resolved by a general rule.'

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Berg, supra note 55, at 162.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 163.

80. Id.

81. Id. As Berg put it, "rulemaking has advantages to an agency which knows where it wants
to go and is in a hurry to get there." Id. at 178.
82. See Chenery and Bell supra, notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
83.

See WAPA-WYo. STAT. §§ 16-3-114, -115; federal APA-5 U.S.C. § 706 (both autho-

rizing judicial review of agency action).
84. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974), supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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PRINCIPAL CASE

In Bessemer the Wyoming Supreme Court considered whether the
EQC acted arbitrarily or capriciously in designating Bessemer Mountain as rare or uncommon. The court held that without rules, the rare
or uncommon statute was too amorphous to permit judicial review.'
Thus, any such designation was inherently arbitrary and capricious.'
The court reversed the designation, remanded the case, and ordered
7
the EQC to make rules to supplement the rare or uncommon statute.
The Court's Reasoning
Justice Thomas wrote the Bessemer opinion. He started by highlighting a dialogue from the EQC hearing, where an EQC member
expressed concern that the EQC did not have any standards defining
"scenic.
An unidentified speaker at the hearing noted that he had
unsuccessfully tried to define the word; he felt that scenic was "in the
eye of the beholder." 9 Justice Thomas agreed, and said the same
comment applied to the phrase "rare or uncommon."'° Thus, he concluded that without defining rules, any rare or uncommon designation
was inherently arbitrary and capricious. 9' He noted that the WAPA required the court to set aside arbitrary or capricious agency action. 9
Before the court ordered the EQC to make rules to augment the
rare or uncommon statute, however, it first determined whether the
EQC had rulemaking authority. 93 The court found EQC rulemaking
authority in two areas. First, rulemaking in accordance with the federal94 APA is necessary when agency action is substantive or legislative,
as opposed to interpretive. 95 The second source for EQC rulemaking
85. Bessemer, 856 P.2d at 451.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 455.
or uncommon statute. The EQC member
88. Id. at 452. "Scenic" is one of the criteria in the rare
was concerned that, without standards, the EQC would be criticized for acting arbitrarily. An attorney favoring the designation conceded that affected persons would complain that the statute was too indefinite. Id.
89.

Id.

90. Id.
91.

Id. at 453.

92. Id. (citing WYO. STAT. § 16-3-114(c)(ii)(A) (1990)).
93.

Id. at 453.

94. It is unclear why the court cited the federal APA instead of the WAPA. See infra note 115
and accompanying text.
95. Bessemer, 856 P.2d at 453 (quoting Mm. States Legal Found. v. Hodel, 668 F. Supp.
1466, 1475 (D. Wyo. 1987)). A substantive or legislative action affects individual rights and obligations. Hodel, 668 F. Supp. at 1475.
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authority originated in an EQA section which provides that the EQC
shall "promulgate rules and regulations necessary for the administration of this act."' Thus, the EQC had rulemaking authority. In fact,
the court reasoned that the word "shall" evinced an express legislative
intent that the EQC promulgate rules clarifying the rare or uncommon
statute.97
Next, the court discussed the policy benefits of rulemaking. The
court explained that the legislature cannot write statutes with language
detailed enough for effective day-to-day administration.98 Instead, the
statute provides the general framework, objectives, and policy. The
legislature authorizes an administrative agency to enhance the statute
with rules.'
Court Authority To Order Rulemaking
With the necessity for rules and EQC rulemaking power established,
the court then found authority for court-ordered rulemaking. The court
cited Professor Davis' treatise which suggested court-ordered rulemaking
was becoming common." ° The court found case law cited by Davis "persuasive," but did not discuss how those cases applied to the Bessemer
Mountain situation.'' Instead, the court distinguished the mandatory
authority cited by the EQC.
The EQC cited Town of Torrington v. Environmental Quality
Council,"0 in which the Wyoming Supreme Court stated that requiring
rules for every agency matter would restrict agency functioning.' 03 To
distinguish Torrington, the Bessemer court cited a limitation in

96. Bessemer, 856 P.2d at 453 (quoting WYo. STAT. § 35-11-112(a)(i)).
97. Id. at 454. The court felt that "shall" was mandatory. See infra note 127 and accompanying text for further discussion.
98. Id. The court explained that the legislature cannot reasonably anticipate the various circumstances that arise in administration of a statute. A statute is constitutionally sufficient if it describes the general policy, the administering agency, and the boundaries of agency authority. Id.
(citing I AM. JUR. 2d Administrative Law § 111 at 911 (1962)).

99. Bessemer, 856 P.2d at 455.
100. Id. at 454 (citing DAVIS, supra note 58, § 7.26 at 128). Davis explained:
The law may be in the early stages of a massive movement toward judicially required
rulemaking that will reduce discretion that is unguided by rules or precedents. Under the
new law, agencies that use systems of precedents are still generally free to choose between
adjudication and rulemaking, but agencies without systems of precedents may be judicially
required to use their rulemaking power to provide guiding standards.
101. Bessemer, 856 P.2d at 454. See infra note 120 and accompanying text (discussing the DAVIS cases).
102.

557 P.2d 1143 (Wyo. 1976).

103.

Id.at 1145.
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Torrington which noted that rulemaking sometimes might be necessary." ° Additionally, the court noted that the EQA required the EQC
to promulgate rules, but that no such statutory requirement existed in
Torrington."5
In closing, the court cited Jergeson v. Board of Trustees of School
DistrictNo. 7. 06 In dictum, the Jergeson court called attention to statutory rulemaking requirements, and warned that it would direct an agency to
make rules upon request by an interested person.'7 In Bessemer, the court
fulfilled its earlier promise and ordered the EQC to make rules listing the
standards for designating lands as rare or uncommon.° 8
ANALYSIS

The Wyoming Supreme Court broke new ground when it ordered
the EQC to make rules.l Unfortunately, the Bessemer ruling has four basic problems. First, it departs from Wyoming precedent, and is not in
accord with other courts that have ordered administrative agencies to
make rules. Second, from a policy standpoint, the ruling unnecessarily
intrudes on agency discretion. Third, the court inexplicably departed from
its past methods of reviewing agency action. Finally, the court's interpretation of the rare or uncommon statute is unpersuasive.
Court-OrderedRules-Rulemaking Versus Adjudication
Bessemer was not a rulemaking versus adjudication case per se.
Rather, the case involved the need for rules to guide a rulemaking proceeding." 0 Nonetheless, case law from Wyoming and other jurisdictions

104. Bessemer, 856 P.2d at 455 (citing Torrington, 557 P.2d at 1146 (Wyo. 1976)). The court also
distinguished Thomson v. Wyoming In-Stream Flow Comm., 651 P.2d 778 (Wyo. 1982) in which it held
that a statute with a clear directive and plain meaning needed no rules. The Bessemer court held that the rare
or uncommon statute had no plain meaning to forego the need for rules. Bessemer, 856 P.2d at 455.
105. Bessemer, 856 P.2d at 455 (referring to Wyo. STAT. § 35-11-112(a)). Note: a statute cited
in Torrington (WYo. STAT. § 35-502.12 (1957)) contained the same language as § 35-11-112(a). See
infra note 127 and accompanying text.
106. 476 P.2d 481 (Wyo. 1970).
107. Bessemer, 856 P.2d at 455 (citing Jergeson, 476 P.2d at 483-84). Note: In Jergeson,
WYO. STAT. § 9-276.20(a)(1) (1957) required the agency to make procedural rules. But the court did
not order rulemaking because the plaintiff did not prove that the lack of rules prejudiced him. The
Bessemer court did not discuss whether the lack of rules prejudiced Rissler.
108. Bessemer, 856 P.2d at 455.
109. Bessemer is the first case in which the Wyoming Supreme Court ordered an administrative
agency to make rules.
110. A rare or uncommon designation hearing is considered a rulemaking proceeding under the
WAPA. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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addressing the choice between rulemaking and adjudication shed light on
Bessemer.1 '
Wyoming Precedent
As an initial matter, the court confused EQC rulemaking authority
with a rulemaking duty. While the EQA does require rulemaking, it does
so only as is "necessary" to administer the act." 2 Prior to Bessemer, the
court recognized the EQC's discretion to decide whether rules were necessary." 3 Bessemer is thus a clear departure from past treatment of the required rulemaking issue by the Wyoming Supreme Court. 4
Moreover, the court's reliance on Mountain States Legal Foundation
v. Hodel' was inappropriate. Hodel held that an agency must make rules
if the agency action is substantive or legislative." 6 Hodel, however, is a
federal case decided under the federal APA. Thus, it is only persuasive
authority, and the reasoning behind it is tenuous.7
Finally, in light of express rulemaking requirements in other EQA
statutes,"' the Bessemer court's holding that the legislature expressly
intended for the EQC to make rules for the rare or uncommon statute is
unconvincing. The Legislature amended the rare or uncommon statute
during litigation focusing on the lack of rules. 119 Yet, the legislature did
not expressly require EQC rulemaking as it had in other EQA statutes.
Federal Precedent
The Bessemer court relied on federal cases cited in the Davis
treatise as persuasive authority for court-imposed rulemaking. 20 Bessemer, however, is not analogous to any of the three categories of
cases in which federal courts have ordered agency rulemaking. 2 The

111. See supra text accompanying note 71 (rulemaking versus adjudication discussion germane
to cases where agency action cannot be characterized as rulemaking or adjudication.)
112. WYO. STAT. § 35-11-112(a). See supra notes 96, 97 and accompanying text (where this
section is described).
113. See Torrington supra note 42 and accompanying text.
114. In addition to Torrington supra note 42, see Thomson note 43 and Jergeson note 107 and

text accompanying each.
115. 668 F. Supp. 1466 (D.Wyo. 1987).
116. See supra note 95.
117. The Hodel case was roundly criticized in a later case involving similar issues-Bob Marshall Alliance v. Hodel, 852 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1988). See supra note 66.

118. See supra note 26.
119. See supra note 29.

120. Bessemer, 856 P.2d at 454. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
121.

See supra BACKGROUND section of this note.
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Davis treatise cited the first category of such cases-cases involving ad
hoc agency determinations of eligibility for tangible economic benefits. For instance, in Ruiz' the Court ruled that adjudication without
rules violated the due process rights of applicants. The rare or uncommon designation, in and of itself, does not substantially affect the
rights of any party. The DEQ can deny a mine permit in an area designated as rare or uncommon.' However, the DEQ can deny permits
for a host of other reasons, such as water pollution, public health,
reclamation concerns, and written objections." 24 The Bessemer court
failed to distinguish between the due process problems in Ruiz and the
relatively innocuous rare or uncommon designation.
Nor is Bessemer analogous to the second category of federal cases
in which courts have ordered rulemaking-cases in which an agency
used adjudication to announce a new policy or law applicable to a
broad class of regulated parties, as in Ford Motor. " By definition,
this rare or uncommon designation is limited to Bessemer Mountain.
Finally, Bessemer is not analogous to the third category of federal
26
cases in which courts have ordered rulemaking-cases like Ruckelshaus
in which the court ordered rulemaking because the agency violated a statutory directive to make rules. In fact, the EQC acted pursuant to a statute-the EQA. The Bessemer court's ruling that the EQC disregarded a
statutory directive to make rules contradicts a prior ruling. The statutory
language that purportedly required rulemaking in Bessemer was identical
to statutory language that the Torrington court held did not require
rulemaking. 27 Since the waste disposal site selection process in
Torrington required case-by-case adjudication, then surely the designation
of rare or uncommon areas requires individual adjudication. 2

122. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974). See supra notes 56-58.
123. See supra note 6.
124. WYO. STAT. § 35-11-406(m) (1988 & Supp 1993) (listing thirteen factors that could lead to

denial of a permit).
125. Ford Motor Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 673 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 999 (1982). See supra notes 61, 62 and accompanying text.
126. Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See supra
note 65 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 40, 97 and accompanying text. The statute, Wyo. STAT. § 35-11-112(a),
applies to the entire EQA, not just the rare or uncommon statute. Section 35-11-112 is titled "Powers
and Duties of the Environmental Quality Council," and contains the rare or uncommon statute, as
well as other language describing general EQC powers and duties.
128. After all, characteristics identifying suitable conditions for waste disposal sites (soil type,

geological features, threat to groundwater, proximity to towns, etc.) could be quantified with relative
ease. Ideal waste disposal sites possess the same general characteristics. On the other hand, rare or
uncommon areas are not always likely to possess similar characteristics. While one area might be
historical and scenic, another area might have little historic and scenic value.
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Precedent from Other States
Not only is Bessemer in conflict with federal cases, but it does not
correspond with other state court decisions regarding agency rulemaking
obligations. For example, a New Jersey court crafted a test to determine
whether to order rulemaking.' 29 Use of the test as an illustration exposes
the problems with Bessemer. The Bessemer Mountain rare or uncommon
designation does not: (1) apply to a wide segment of regulated parties, (2)
apply generally to all similarly situated persons, (3) apply in future designations, (4) prescribe a legal standard not reasonably inferable from the
statute, or (5) reflect a new policy or a material change from past agency
position. 3 While the designation does interpret the law, 3' the New Jersey court required that most of the six test criteria be met before it would
order rulemaking.' 32
Additionally, an Oregon court described the factors a court should
consider when determining whether rulemaking is needed to define vague
statutory language. 3 Assuming that statutory language is vague, a court
should examine agency duties, organization, and responsibility. The
broader the agency duties, powers, and responsibilities, the more deference a court should accord the agency." The EQA gives the EQC sweeping power to issue licenses and variances and to revoke or modify rules,
orders, and permits.' The Bessemer court failed to recognize the scope
and importance of EQC duties, organization, and power. Given the broad
discretion the legislature has conferred to the EQC, the court should not
have concluded that the legislature intended that the EQC make rules for
the rare or uncommon statute.
Policy of Rulemaking
The Bessemer court cited policy concerns as justification for ordering EQC rulemaking. The court referred to a massive movement towards

129.

Metromedia, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 478 A.2d 742 (N.J. 1984). See supra note

70 and accompanying text.
130. Rissler argued that consideration of paleontology (Nothosaur fossils) by the EQC was a
new policy outside the scope of the statute. The EQC asserted that paleontology was properly considered as a "surface geological" factor. See supra note 9.
131. (An element in the Metromedia test.) Nonetheless, it could be argued that virtually everything an agency does is an interpretation of a rule, policy, or law.
132. Metromedia, supra note 69 at 751.
133. Trebesch v. Employment Div., 710 P.2d 136 (Or. 1985). See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
134. Trebesch, 710 P.2d at 139-40.
135. WYO. STAT. § 35-11-112(c). See supra note 24.
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judicially required rulemaking.1 16 In fact, court-ordered rulemaking is
often criticized. 3 7 Most courts still defer to agency discretion to choose
between rulemaking and adjudication. 3 While rules are desirable in many
instances, Bessemer is not such a case. Rules for the rare or uncommon
statute will have little utility.
Years before the Bessemer case, the EQC considered making rules
for the rare or uncommon statute. The EQC decided that rules would be
pointless.3 9 Nevertheless, now the EQC must make rules. Notably, the
draft rules proposed by the EQC pursuant to the Bessemer ruling came
under heavy fire from many citizens and industry groups for being too
broad. Indeed, some people claimed that the entire state of Wyoming
could be designated as rare or uncommon under the draft rules." 4 While
an exhaustive list of characteristics might describe some rare or uncommon lands, some items undoubtedly will be overlooked. Furthermore, if
the characteristics present in a certain area fall within the rules, affected
parties will have limited opportunity to challenge a designation. Thus,
parties like Rissler will have less procedural protection. 141

Arbitrary or Capricious Review Method
The Bessemer decision suffers a further flaw in that the court departed without explanation from established methods of review. The WAPA
required the court to review the administrative record to determine whether the agency action was arbitrary or capricious." 2 Previously, when
reviewing agency action, the court focused on whether the facts supported
the decision. "

136. See supra note 100.
137. See supra note 63.
138. See supra note 63.
139. See supra note 29.
140. Hugh Jackson, EQCApproves Revised 'Rare or Uncommon' Rules, CASPER STAR TRIB.,
Dec. 16, 1993 at Al. While the rare or uncommon statute has a possible affect only on non-coal mine
permits, the agricultural, oil & gas, and public utility industries criticized the draft rules as being too
expansive. In response, the EQC expressly excluded the agricultural and oil & gas industries from the
operation of the rules. Id at AI0.
141. See supra notes 78, 81 and accompanying text.
142. WYO. STAT. § 16-3-114(c) (1990) provides: 'the court shall review the whole record or
those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error, The
reviewing court shall ... [hiold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions
"
found to be... [alrbitrary, capricious...
143. See, e.g., Palmer v. Crook County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 785 P.2d 1160, 1162 (Wyo. 1990)
(where the court stated: 'in determining whether an agency decision is arbitrary [or] capricious, ...
a court must review the record taken as a whole and ascertain whether the decision is supported by
the evidence ... in the record."). See also State ex rel. Worker's Compensation v. Brown, 805 P.2d
830 (Wyo. 1991); Union Telephone Co. v. Wyo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 821 P.2d 550 (Wyo. 1991).
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In Bessemer, however, the court referred to the administrative record only once-when it examined a discourse at the designation hearing.'" The court never mentioned the EQC's "Statement of Reasons" for
the designation, 45 nor discussed whether the EQC acted with adequate
information.'46 Thus, it ignored a clear statutory directive and established
review methods."t7

The Rare or Uncommon Statute
Finally, the Bessemer court erred in ruling that the rare or uncommon statute is too "amorphous" to permit judicial review.148 Arguably, it
is not amorphous.'49 The statute requires designated lands to: (1) have
particular wildlife, scenic, historical, archaeological, surface geological,
or botanical value, and (2) be rare or uncommon.
Surely, the EQC has the technical expertise to determine whether the
land has particular wildlife, scenic, historical, archaeological, surface
geological, or botanical value. Although "scenic" is a subjective term,
most reasonable persons could decide whether land is "scenic." Indeed,
the Bessemer court exposed the shortcomings of its ruling when it pointed
out the difficulty of defining "scenic."'' 50 If, as the court suggested, "scenic" is in the eye of the beholder, then rules defining "scenic" are not
possible.
Nor is the phrase "rare or uncommon" necessarily amorphous.
"Rare" and "uncommon" are quantitative concepts. Each land area designated as rare or uncommon is, by definition, likely to possess characteristics not common to other areas. Thus, the EQC could determine if the
land in question is rare or uncommon after: (1) an evidentiary hearing,
and (2) comparing the characteristics of the candidate land with those of
other lands. The Bessemer ruling removes the EQC's discretion to make a
quantitative comparison. Given the prior liberal interpretation of the EQA
by the court, this ruling is perplexing.' 5 '

144. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 12.
146. See supra note 29 (where the EQC's decision to substitute detailed fact findings for rules is
discussed).
147. WYO. STAT. § 16-3-114(c), supra note 142 and Palmer, 785 P.2d 1160, supra note 143.
148. Bessemer, 856 P.2d at 451.
149. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DlCTIONARY 38 (4th ed. 1977) defines "amorphous" as:
having no definite form; shapeless; being without definite character; unclassifiable.
150. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION

The Bessemer decision marked a departure from past treatment of
the required rulemaking issue by the Wyoming Supreme Court."5 2 Bessemer is the first case in which the Wyoming Supreme Court has ordered an
agency to make rules.' Unfortunately, the court did not adequately
explain why it did not follow its precedents. Furthermore, the facts of
Bessemer are not in accord with5 4cases from other jurisdictions in which
courts have ordered rulemaking.
Additionally, the policy rationale offered by the court is not convincing.'55 While rules protect the rights of parties facing all-powerful
agencies, rules for the rare or uncommon statute offer little protection. Indeed, rules might limit procedural protection. For if the characteristics of
an area fall within the rules, affected parties will have limited opportunity
to challenge a designation.' 56
The real issue behind the entire the Bessemer Mountain controversy
was the utility and desirability of the rare or uncommon statute itself, not
the lack of rules.l"7 Obviously the court could not discuss the merit of the
statute, but it should have realized that rules would be of little value.
Finally, the Bessemer court inexplicably digressed from established
methods of reviewing agency action. It did not examine the entire administrative record or focus on whether the agency action was supported by
the facts.' Furthermore, the court abandoned its usual liberal construction of the Wyoming Environmental Quality Act.' 59
Bessemer was not the case for the court to embark on the journey of
judicially-imposed rulemaking. The court should have waited until a case
with a compelling need for court-ordered rulemaking presented itself.
Nonetheless, what is done is done. The EQC has made rules. 1'" Whether

the rules will have any real utility or enjoy public support remains to be
seen. Whether Bessemer was simply a warning to agencies to be more

152.

See supra notes 113, 114 and accompanying text.

153. On occasion, the court suggested that an agency make rules (see e.g., Jergeson, supra note 45).
154. See supra notes 56 to 66 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 78, 81 and accompanying text.
157. The whole Bessemer controversy prompted one Wyoming legislator to promise a review of
the rare or uncommon statute in the Legislature. Hugh Jackson, 'Rare or Uncommon' Scope LUmited-Paseneaux PromisesEffort to ChangeLaw, CASPER STAR TRIB., Dec. 15, 1993 at Al.
158.

See supra note 143.

159. See supra note 20.
160. See Hugh Jackson, supra note 140.
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specific or a signal of a propensity towards judicially-required rulemaking
in Wyoming is unclear. Bessemer could fade away to the dusty solace of a
bookshelf, but with its potential value as precedent, it might be too sweet
for lawyers and the courts to resist.
MICHAEL GREGORY WEISZ
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